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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS: 
A REALIST PHENOMENOLOGICAL VERSUS A “NEUTRALIST” 
METAPHYSICS OF CATEGORIES
he questions what ontological categories are and which 
points of view and methods should be applied to deter-
mine their nature are far from being easy to answer; and 
even more difficult is a reply to the query how many and which 
specific categories there are, a question that is impossible to 
solve before one has reached clarity about what ontological cat-
egories are and what they are not.1 Therefore, we shall turn to 
the question of a list of categories only at the end of this essay, 
approaching this topic only briefly.
In order to achieve clarity about our subject, we will fi rst in-
vestigate ontological categories by means of distinguishing them 
from transcendentals, from modes of being, as well as from logi-
cal, linguistic and other categories that are often confused with 
them. Most lists of categories not only contain a fusion of onto-
logical with logical and linguistic categories, but also mix onto-
logical categories with transcendentals and modes of being that 
will be shown to be entirely different data.2 In order to identify 
1. For a brief and informative account of the complexities and diffi culties of the 
problem of categories and a historical overview of their discussion from Aristotle 
to the present, see A. THOMASSON, Categories, in EDWARD N. ZALTA (ed.) The 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition) URL = <http://plato.
stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/categories/>2013. This helpful entry, 
however, also lacks the distinctions through which we hope to contribute to a 
philosophy of categories in this article.
2. One might show this in detail regarding the lists of categories of R. CHISHOLM, 
A Realistic Theory of Categories (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996), 
who includes various modes of being among his list of categories, or R. GROSS-
MANN, The Categorial Structure of the World (Indiana University Press, Bloom-
ington, 1983), who mixes together, like Kant, logical categories (such as nega-
tions and quantifi ers) with ontological categories (such as relations and facts). 
The same could be shown about J. HOFFMAN and G. ROSENKRANTZ, Substance 
Among Other Categories (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994), whose 
list of categories mixes together ontological categories with logical ones, with 
transcendentals (transcendental “entity” as such), as well as with modes of be-
ing, which we hope to show to be entirely different things. The same applies 
to E. J. LOWE, Kinds of Being: A Study of Individuation, Identity and the Logic of 
T
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ontological categories, and to contribute possibly towards the goal 
of a complete list of them, we have therefore to distinguish them 
sharply from logical categories, transcendentals, modes of being 
and other non-categorial data.
The present study of categories is based on the presupposi-
tion (which cannot be clarifi ed here but is open to philosophical 
knowledge) that an ontology of categories —in the proper sense 
of “ontology”— cannot and must not be “neutral”, neither in the 
sense of leaving it open whether we deal with ontological, logical, 
or linguistic entities, nor in the sense that our investigation would 
leave it open whether the ontological categories metaphysics stud-
ies are subjective or objective, rooted in the nature of things or 
 Sortal Terms (Blackwell, Oxford, 1989) and The Four-Category Ontology: A Meta-
physical Foundation for Natural Science (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006), who on 
the one hand takes categories to be ontological categories describing them in 
terms of “what kinds of things can exist and coexist”, but on the other hand 
mixes modes of being and transcendentals in his list. His description is in both 
respects quite insuffi cient. For the defi nition of category given by him would 
cover even the infi ma species, and thus kinds of things which are rather the op-
posite of ontological categories, namely not the highest kinds which are never 
species of more general genera, but the lowest kinds which can only be species 
and not genera of subordinated classes of things; on the other hand, he includes 
in his list transcendentals which, precisely by being present in all categories, 
entirely transcend categories and are not themselves categories. G. RYLE, The 
Concept of Mind (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1949) and Categories, in 
Collected Papers, Volume II: Collected Essays 1929-1968 (Hutchinson, London, 
1971) 170-184, does not speak directly of categories of entities, but rather of 
differing logical types of concepts. J. CUMPA, Categoriality: Three Disputes Over 
the Structure of the World, in J. CUMPA and E. TEGTMEIER (eds.), Ontological 
Categories (Ontos-Verlag, Frankfurt, 2011) 15-65, and Sobre la expresión. Ensayo 
sobre las categorías de la noche y del anochecer, “Kriterion: Revista de Filosofía” 127 
(2013) 227-245, claims that “all classifi cation of entities is ontological” which is 
a doubtful claim even though he adds that not all classifi cation is categorial. Just 
consider purely logical and linguistic classifi cations which are not ontological 
in the widest sense. Even not all classifi cations of entities can be called “onto-
logical”. For example a biologists’ classifi cation of 2000 kinds of beetles is not 
to be called “ontological”. Solely if fundamentally different kinds of being are 
classifi ed in a way that considers their different distance to nothingness and 
their fundamental and most general kind of being, and only when the point of 
view of such a classifi cation is deep enough and does not consider accidental 
properties of a set or group to allow for a “categorization”, can a classifi cation 
be called “ontological”. For example, the class of all men who wear black hats is 
not a genus, nor a species, let alone a category.
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constructs of the human mind or of language, or are nothing but 
words used in certain combinations with other words.3
These are two entirely different meanings of “neutrality”, 
of which the fi rst, in a way that evaporates metaphysics properly 
speaking, fails to elaborate the fundamentally different data of on-
tological, logical, and other categories, while the second leads to 
an abandonment of metaphysics and entails various contradictions, 
especially in Gracia’s version. The present essay, by distinguishing 
ontological and logical categories from modes of being and tran-
scendentals, is largely, though only implicitly, dedicated to over-
coming the fi rst sense of “neutralism”. Therefore, my objections 
to this kind of ontological “neutrality” do not need to be stated at 
this point. Hence, let me turn here only to a brief consideration of 
the second meaning of the “neutrality-approach” to the problem of 
categories, and to some of the reasons why I am critical of it:
Gracia, the chief exponent of a “neutral ontology of catego-
ries”, states4 that his essay on metaphysics is neutral: “with respect 
to the question whether they [the categories] are linguistic, con-
ceptual, or real in the sense that they are categories of each sort but 
not all are categories of one sort”.5 Indeed, the author, as does Copi 
in his Symbolic Logic, repeatedly prides himself of having written a 
book acceptable to all metaphysicians regardless of whether they are 
realists, idealists, conceptualists, nominalists, etc., or even deny the 
possibility of metaphysics. Such a claim, however, is fraught with 
many unsurmountable diffi culties and lends itself immediately to 
three critical objections:
(a) In the fi rst place, it leads to many contradictions to other 
parts and actually to the major tenets of the book, for example to the 
author’s critique of metaphysical nominalism, conceptualism, and 
3. J. E. GRACIA, Metaphysics and Its Task. The Search for the Categorial Foundation of 
Knowledge (State University of New York Press, Albany, 1999) defends such a “neu-
tral ontology”. For a critical investigation of this view of such a double “neutrality” 
of an ontology of categories, see J. SEIFERT, What is Metaphysics and What Its Tasks? 
An attempt to Answer this Question with Critical Refl ections on Gracia’s Book, in R. 
A. DELFINO (ed.), What are We to Understand Gracia to Mean? Realist Challenges to 
Metaphysical Neutralism (Rodopi, Amsterdam/New York, 2006) 21-45.
4. J. E. GRACIA, Metaphysics and Its Task cit.
5. Ibid., p. xvii. See also ibid., p. 134.
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realism, in which precisely these and many other positions about 
categories that had fi rst been declared compatible with the treatise, 
are rejected as untenable, contradictory, reductionistic, and in other 
ways wrong.6 Notwithstanding his harsh critique of the mentioned 
positions, and immediately after having criticized them as false and 
reductionist, the author declares them as compatible with a “neu-
tral” standpoint in the second sense of the term.7
(b) The “neutrality” of Gracia’s theory of categories (to which 
he reduces metaphysics) inevitably leads to contradictions by treat-
ing mutually exclusive standpoints and positions that are precisely 
incompatible with his “neutral” metaphysics as if they were compat-
ible with each other. For example, to understand ontological catego-
ries as the most universal and highest essential genera of entities is 
incompatible with the assertion that they are just words or that they 
are whatever “can be predicated of other terms or expressions”.8 For 
no ontological category is just a word and most ontological catego-
ries cannot be predicated of terms and expressions at all.
(c) The “neutrality” of the position in both senses of the term 
leads to an evaporation of any philosophically and metaphysically 
signifi cant content of the notion “category”. Let us assume that cat-
egories are nothing but words and ways in which these are used. 
Then precisely metaphysics and metaphysical categories do not 
exist (even though also this nominalism and the resulting nega-
tion of metaphysics remains contradictory in presupposing some 
understanding of being). Hence a neutrality that prescinds from all 
these differences leads to a philosophical obliteration of the fi eld 
“metaphysics”, just as Copi’s prescinding from the question whether 
logical laws are objective, subjective, ontologically founded, or just 
linguistic, leads not to a pure philosophical science of logic but to a 
potential negation of what logic really is about, or at least to a total 
abstracting from what constitutes the most fundamental question 
of philosophical logic, namely what logical entities such as concepts, 
6. Ibid., pp. 182-205.
7. Ibid., p. 205: “This means that the very notion of category should be understood 
to be neutral with respect to whether categories are extramental kinds of enti-
ties, concepts, or words”.
8. Ibid., p. 177.
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propositions, and logical laws are and wherein their necessity and 
that of all laws of valid inferences are rooted and consist in.
In sharp contrast to such a double “neutrality”, our analysis seeks 
to elucidate the true nature of the fundamental datum of ontological 
categories. (There is a third and very good sense of neutrality pre-
sent in Gracias’s position that is, however, only misleadingly called 
“neutrality”.)9
The following investigation, while claiming the character of an 
original philosophical investigation for itself, may simultaneously be 
understood as part of a large number of original philosophical works 
on categories throughout two and a half millennia, and as an invitation 
to other thinkers to engage in further investigations along the realist 
phenomenological and content-full (non-formal and non-neutral) way 
of studying ontological categories proposed in this essay.
As to the question of the originality of the present study, I 
wish to remark fi rst that I believe that in philosophy truth holds an 
absolute priority over originality, such that any theory or statement 
that is true, even if it has been made a thousand times before, is of 
far higher value than strikingly original but false theories, which do 
9. This meaning of “neutrality” is expressed by J. E. GRACIA, Metaphysics and Its Task 
cit., 206 in the following way: “Hence, whether a particular category is a linguistic, 
mental, or extramental kind of entity, should not be determined before an investigation 
of the category is carried out…” In such passages “neutrality” is no longer defi ned in 
terms of an epoché regarding the question of whether a category is mental or extra-
mental, but as an openness-of-mind to investigate each category in its own terms and 
only then to decide the question whether it is just subjective or objective, mental or 
extramental, etc. But this sense of “neutrality” should be better called a striving 
for adequacy, differentiation or “comprehensiveness” of a metaphysical position. 
The assertion that metaphysics needs to be “neutral” in this sense is a very good 
point indeed that requires, however, a rejection of both of the other senses of neu-
trality and consists in a differentiated and unreductionistic account of each kind 
of category in its own nature. It recognizes all of the categories (ontological, con-
ceptual, linguistic, etc.) and distinguishes each in its own identity and difference. 
It also requires overcoming of what Gracia sees as a onesided explanation and 
an absolutization of some categories or of some diffi culties of the single conceptions 
of categories he carefully expounds. (J. E. GRACIA, Metaphysics and Its Task cit., 
182 ff.) In other words, he wishes to recognize both transcendent and immanent, 
ontological and conceptual, etc. categories and the characteristics of each, and 
thus overcome a position that seeks to explain the whole variety of phenomena 
termed “categories” in the light of just one of these. And this needs to be done by 
a comprehensive metaphysical study.
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not only lack that same value of truth but possess, to the degree of 
their falsity, a great philosophical disvalue. In this spirit, my essay 
wants to fi nd what is true about ontological categories, regardless 
of whether Aristotle or Duns Scotus, or hundred other minds have 
said the same before or not.
 Secondly, the important originality of a philosophical work 
consists primarily in the degree to which the philosopher gains 
a contact of his own with those realities and “things themselves” 
which he is treating, instead of just presenting thoughts of other 
philosophers without having or even seeking any contact of his own 
with the things affi rmed by them.10 In this sense I hope that there is 
not one single thought in this essay that is not original.
Thirdly, inasmuch as one arrives at new distinctions in philoso-
phy, it is mostly the case that at closer examination the Salomonic 
wisdom of the Old Testament “nil sub sole novum” (Ecclesiastes 
1:10) applies: most everything true that one can see and say has been 
seen or stated in one way or another before by some great or small 
thinker (and unfortunately also almost every error and sophistry has 
been formulated before by some preceding sophist). Nevertheless, 
in the light of this third criterion of “originality”, I would say that I 
do not know any single book or article in which the ontological cat-
egories are more sharply distinguished from transcendentals, from 
modes of being, from logical and other categories than in this essay, 
which allows it to make some claim to originality in the third sense 
of the term. This relates this article also positively to my own previ-
ous work on the subject.11
10. See J. SEIFERT, Texts and Things, “Annual ACPA Proceedings” LXXII (1999) 41-68.
11. In none of my main books on metaphysics —J. SEIFERT, Essence and Existence. 
A New Foundation of Classical Metaphysics on the Basis of ‘Phenomenological Real-
ism,’ and a Critical Investigation of ‘Existentialist Thomism’, “Aletheia” I (1977) 
17-157 and 371-459.; Sein und Wesen (Universitätsverlag C. Winter, Heidelberg, 
1996); Essere e persona. Verso una fondazione fenomenologica di una metafi sica clas-
sica e personalistica (Vita e Pensiero Milano, 1989); Gott als Gottesbeweis. Eine 
phänomenologische Neubegründung des ontologischen Arguments (Universitätsverlag 
C. Winter, Heidelberg, 2000)—, nor in numerous essays on ontological ques-
tions, I have ever before drawn out with equal clarity the distinction between 
categories and transcendentals, nor that between categories and the different 
modes of being.
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ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES AND WHAT THEY ARE NOT
Ontological categories are the  most universal “genera” of being, i.e. 
the most basic distinct kinds and classes of entities, such as “sub-
stance”, “quantity”, “quality” and the like. The distinguishing mark 
of categories is not their universality as such, because each gen-
eral essence, including that of purple and red of a certain shade, or 
of “dusk”, has the characteristics of abstractness, universality, and 
“dominion” over potentially infi nitely many individuals, but their 
character of fi rst or “highest genera” of being, which cannot be re-
garded as species of another, higher genus of being. Porphyry ex-
presses this clearly when he says that the category (generalissimum, 
highest genus) is that “quod, cum genus est, non est species”,12 i.e. 
a category is a (highest) genus of being that cannot be considered 
as a species of a higher genus. He expresses the same state of affairs 
by saying (again in Boethius’ translation) “supra quod non est alius 
supraveniens genus” (higher than which there is no further genus). 
From this understanding of an ontological category as “high-
est kind of being”, which we owe to Aristotle,13 and which no doubt 
12. PORPHYRY, Isagoge. Texto griego, trans. Boethii, introd., trad., notas, apéndices y 
bibliografía de J.J. García Norro y Rogelio Rovira (Anthropos, Madrid, 2003), 17.
13. Aristotle, besides discussing the most important ones of them (from a distinc-
tively ontological point of view) extensively in his Metaphysics, particularly in 
Books V 7, 1017 a 22 ff., VII, IX, and XI, introduces the ontological categories 
also in his logical work The Categories, without distinguishing therein clearly 
logical categories, semantic categories (meanings of uncomposed words), and onto-
logical categories. See also Giovanni Reale`s comments in his commentary on 
Aristotle’s metaphysics and on Plotinus’s critique of the Aristotelian categories: 
G. REALE, Aristotele: Metafi sica. Saggio introduttivo, testo greco con traduzione 
a fronte e commentario, 3 vol. (Vita e Pensiero, Milano 1993), 213; PLOTINO, 
Enneadi. Traduzione di Roberto Radici. Saggio introduttivo, prefazione e noti 
di commento di Giovanni Reale (Arnoldo Mondadori Editore, Milano, 2002), 
1411 ff. Nevertheless, also in the Categories Aristotle may be said to treat (even 
mainly, or at least very prominently) ontological categories, both in his minimal 
list of the fourfold distinction related to “predicable (not predicable) of” and 
“being(not being)-in” and in his maximal list of ten categories. See ARISTOTLE, 
Categories, in J. BARNES (ed.), The Complete Works of Aristotle, 2 vols. transl. J. 
L. Ackrill (Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995) 3-24. For the reason 
of this ambiguity there have been presented different titles for his Categories 
and big controversies broke out over the question whether the Categories were a 
work of ontology (to be titled “the genera of being”, a title proposed by some but 
rejected by Porphyry), of logic, as Porphyry suggests: PORPHYRY, Isagoge cit.; 
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corresponds to a most basic datum, regardless of the name we give 
it, it follows that a number of important objects of metaphysics that 
are frequently confused with categories fall outside their realm:
1. Categories are not “Transcendentals” 
In the fi rst place, the investigation of a being and properties possessed 
by all categories of being, and of principles of being which apply to all 
beings of any category, is prior to, or at any rate falls outside of, the 
study of ontological categories. For in dealing with being or with entia 
as such, we precisely do not deal with the most fundamental differ-
ent genera of being, the categories, but with something that “unites 
them” all, that is common to them all, applies to them all, without 
itself being a genus, and is thus prior to categorial distinctions.
Metaphysics has usually spoken of being as such, inasmuch as 
it is found in all things and categories, and of the fi rst principles of 
being, as “transcendent” (to all categories, categorial differences of 
things and limitations) or as “transcendental”, following the use of 
the term in medieval philosophy.
This sense of “transcendental” is entirely based on a realist un-
derstanding of being and therefore sharply distinct from the Kantian 
sense of “transcendental”, which aims at an opposite to the trans-
cendent: namely at immanent forms of perception and thought, the 
origins of which would lie in the subject and simultaneously in a 
Isagoge. Testo griego a fronte. Pref., intrud., traduzione e apparati di Giuseppe 
Girgenti. In appendice versione latina di Severino Boezio (Bompiani, Milano, 
2004), or of grammar or semantics that deals just with word-meanings. Girgenti 
(op. cit., 26-34) quotes a number of passages in the Isagoge in which it becomes 
clear that Porphyry understands the categories of Aristotle not only as logical, 
but also as ontological categories. C. EVANGELIOU, Aristotle’s Categories & Por-
phyry (E.J. Brill, Leiden-New York-Köln, 1996) 19 ff., 23-32, reports in detail 
about this controversy which spans from ancient philosophy to the present. Plo-
tinus (Enn. VI, 1-3), a great critic of the Aristotelian division of 10 categories, 
adhered clearly to the ontological interpretation of them (C. EVANGELIOU, op. 
cit., 94 ff.). However, Plotinus 1) denies categories that could both cover the 
sensible and the intelligible world, except in terms of equivocation (homonym-
ity); 2) drastically reduces their number to fi ve for the intelligible, and fi ve for 
the sensible world, holding that some of Aristotle’s categories can be reduced to 
others on his list.
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sphere that would be found, at least in its origin, completely outside 
of any experience and of the world of appearances.14
The notion of transcendental used in the following does 
therefore not only disagree with “metaphysical neutrality”, but is 
also radically opposed to any subjectivization of the transcendental 
realm and of categories, which I have criticized sharply and repeat-
edly, in the spirit of some prominent realist phenomenologists of 
the Göttingen and Munich schools, and with many reasons.15 In 
14. According to this Kantian understanding of the “transcendentality” of the a 
priori forms of sense-intuition and thought, the latter (the categories and prin-
ciples of understanding) would not apply to being in itself and to its most fun-
damental distinctions and classes, a sphere allegedly closed to our knowledge, 
but things would just be perceived through our subjective forms of intuition of 
space and time, and be thought through our subjective forms of thought that 
Kant identifi es with the categories and principles based thereupon. These tran-
scendental subjective categories and principles of understanding, engendered by 
and in the subject, and merely applied to, or projected into, the objects of human 
experience (the appearances) would not allow us any theoretical cognitive access 
to things in themselves, to being and essence as they are in themselves. And 
when human reason leaves the entire fi eld of immediate experience, such as in 
thinking of God, soul, or world, the situation of the human intellect would still 
be far worse. For then the human mind would, according to this Kantian view, 
construct transcendental ideas which cannot be applied to any object of experi-
ence. Man, inasmuch as he has to conceive of them as real in themselves with a 
kind of subjective necessity of thinking that compels him to conceive of world, 
soul, and God as real in themselves, would inevitably fall prey to a transcen-
dental illusion, from which only the recognition of their origin in the subject 
can (partially) cure him. See I. KANT, Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by 
Norman K. Smith (Macmillan and St Martin’s Press, Toronto/New York, 1929, 
1965), “transcendental aesthetics”, “transcendental logic”, “transcendental dia-
lectics”. How Kant seeks to bridge the divorce between human subjectivity and 
the world of things in themselves through his Critique of Practical Reason and 
why such a Kantian bridging and escape from the immanentism of his concep-
tion of categories fails is beyond the scope of this essay.
15. See especially the work of two fathers of phenomenological realism: A. REI-
NACH, Concerning Phenomenology, in R. N. BECK (ed.) Perspectives in Philosophy 
(Holt, Reinhart, & Winston, New York, 1969), Über Phänomenologie, in Sämt-
liche Werke. Kritische Ausgabe mit Kommentar, Bd. I: Die Werke, Teil I: Kritische 
Neuausgabe (1905-1914), Teil II: Nachgelassene Texte (1906-1917), pp. 531-550; 
D. VON HILDEBRAND, What is Philosophy? 3rd edn, with a New Introductory 
Essay by Josef Seifert (Routledge, London, 1991), Che cos’è la fi losofi a?/What Is 
Philosophy? (Bonpiani, Milano, 2001). See also J. SEIFERT, Essence and Existence 
cit., Back to Things in Themselves. A Phenomenological Foundation for Classical Real-
ism (Routledge, London, 1987), and Vissza a magánvaló dolgokhoz. Translated 
and introduced by Mátyás Szalay (Kairosz Kiadó, Budapest, 2013). The latter 
constitutes a new version of Back to Things in Themselves that represents the most 
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the following, I shall attempt to unfold the objective essence of 
the ontological categories, i.e., of the most fundamental different 
kinds of being.16
In our sense, closely related to that of the term in medieval 
philosophy, the term “transcendental” refers chiefl y to three things:
1. TO BEING AS SUCH, as it is common to beings of all catego-
ries; this being is eo ipso indefi nable because it has no higher genus 
above it and therefore cannot be defi ned in terms of its specifi c 
difference from such a (non-existent) higher genus. Moreover, 
transcendental being is not itself a highest genus nor a category of 
being,17 because it is “open” to all modes, categories, kinds, and 
species of beings and is in them all in a merely analogous way that 
contradicts its being itself a highest “genus”, “being as such”, of 
which, for example the color “red”, “man” and “God” would be 
species.18 Transcendental “being” cannot exist at all as such except 
in a being of a certain essence, i.e., in a being that belongs to a 
defi nitive and considerably enlarged edition of the work. Especially the section 
on the realist phenomenological cogito is further elaborated and enlarged by a 
detailed analysis and critique of Kant’s charge (put forward in the “Paralogism 
of Pure Reason” of the Critique of Pure Reason) that the Cogito argument is 
built on an equivocation of the ego cogitans once understood as object thought 
through the subjective categories, and then as subject of consciousness. See the 
masterful work of R. VERA GONZÁLEZ, Crítica a la ontología y gnoseología del yo 
en Paul Natorp desde la perspectiva de la fenomenología realista (2010, published 
electronically on http://eprints.ucm.es/10062/1/T31456.pdf); see also J. SEI-
FERT, Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft. Die Widerspruchsfreiheit der 
Wirklichkeit – trotz Kant (Karl Alber, Freiburg/München, 2001), Superación del 
escándalo de la razón pura. La ausencia de contradicción de la realidad, a pesar de Kant 
(Ediciones Cristianidad, Madrid, 2007), Sein und Wesen cit., Essere e persona cit.
16. See on such an understanding of ontological categories, besides ARISTOTLE, 
The Categories/On Interpretation, translated by H. P. Cooke (William Heine-
mann Ltd., London / Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass, 61973), G. 
REALE, op. cit., F. BRENTANO, op. cit., J. SEIFERT, Essere e persona cit., ch. 5-9.
17. Aristotle noted this in Metaphysics 998b23, 1059b31, but many later thinkers 
confuse it, for example R. CHISHOLM, A Realistic Theory of Categories cit., who 
includes the transcendental ens (“entia”) among his list of categories, as the 
highest thereof. Something similar applies to many other thinkers, for example 
to the list of categories in J. HOFFMAN and G. ROSENKRANTZ, op. cit., who mix 
together ontological categories with transcendentals as well as to E. J. LOWE, 
The Four-Category Ontology cit.
18. See J. SEIFERT, Essere e persona cit., ch. 7.
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certain category and has a nature and essence above and beyond 
just “being”.19
At least all fi nite beings also belong to a most universal class 
and genus of being, which is what the term category means, but 
being as transcendental is not such a class. Moreover, transcendental 
being is entailed in all genera and species of being: in life-less and 
in living substances, in colors and tones, in all species and subspe-
cies of animals and plants, in human persons, angels, in fi ctional 
objects represented in literature, and in all other entities of any cat-
egory and modality even if none of these actualizes the full poten-
tial and perfection of “transcendental being”, except the absolute, 
divine being, God. Thus, transcendental being is not any genus of 
being. Any attempt to regard it as a concrete entity: (transcendental) 
“being as such”, and to treat it as if it were a supreme genus of being 
(a category), as well as any attempt to hypostasize this “transcenden-
tal being”, will lead to some form of identifying it with nothingness 
(because in isolation it would be nothing), or, in a more confused 
19. A detailed analysis of this fact I have offered in J. SEIFERT, Sein und Wesen 
cit., and in J. SEIFERT, Esse, Essence, and Infi nity: a Dialogue with Existentialist 
Thomism, “The New Scholasticism” LVIII (1984), 84-98. I cannot here embark 
on a careful investigation of a very different sense of “transcendental” Duns 
Scotus has investigated, who sees the most important feature of the transcen-
dental in its character of a pure perfection, i.e. a perfection which to possess 
is absolutely better than not to possess it and which therefore, in their perfect 
form, exist in God. These transcendental pure perfections include all classical 
ones, as those mentioned above, but also include some categories (for example 
substance), but not all (for example not characteristics of time and space). In 
addition, these pure perfections include many characteristics which are neither 
found in beings of all categories nor in beings of a certain category as such: for 
example life (there are non-living substances), personhood (there are imper-
sonal plants and animals), knowledge, wisdom, justice, and love, all of which 
are exclusively found in persons, and all exclusively divine perfections such as 
omniscience, necessary real existence, aseity, etc. See A. WOLTER, The Transcen-
dentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus (Franciscan Institute 
Publications, St. Bonaventure, New York, 1946). I have investigated this sense 
of transcendentality and the notion of pure perfections extensively in J. SEI-
FERT, Essere e persona cit., ch. 5; Gott als Gottesbeweis cit., J. SEIFERT, Essere Per-
sona Come Perfezione Pura. Il Beato Duns Scoto e una nuova metafi sica personalistica, 
in De Homine (Herder/Università Lateranense, Roma, 1994) 57-75, Erkenntnis 
des Vollkommenen. Wege der Vernunft zu Gott (Lepanto Verlag, Bonn, 2010), Back 
to Things in Themselves cit.
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thought, with a pantheistically conceived God.20 Transcendental 
being can only be in some categorial form or in the perfect form 
of an absolutely infi nite being but never in isolation, for itself; it 
neither is a category nor a highest genus.
Of course, the extreme abstractness of the categories and their 
analogous form of being in different spheres of being also excludes 
thinking that “substance” is a genus of which a stone, a fl y, man, and 
God would be species. In this respect, we could say, with Cajetan, 
that a category is not a genus that has fundamentally the same con-
tent in all beings but an “analogous universal” and an analogous genus 
(an analogon).21 If we speak of it univocally, this has to be understood 
purely logically in the sense of radically abstracting logical concepts, 
not ontologically nor in the sense of logical-linguistic univocity of 
those specifi c terms that refl ect the fundamentally different kinds of 
being in their meaning.22
2. SECONDLY, THE TERM “TRANSCENDENTAL” LIKEWISE APPLIES TO 
THE TRANSCENDENTAL PROPERTIES, i.e. to properties that character-
ize all things regardless of their categorical form and essence. In 
these transcendental properties all things participate and have some 
share, at least in a minimal degree of perfection. Such “transcenden-
20. As we fi nd done in Hegel’s Logic in the dialectics of being and nothingness, in 
which “pure being” is held both to be identical with nothingness and the op-
posite of it. Hegel believes that all becoming can be explained through such a 
dialectical relation between being and nothing, because, alone and for itself, 
it cannot be and thus would be nothing indeed. See the superb critique of the 
equivocations contained in Hegelian dialectis in W. BECKER, Idealistische und 
materialistische Dialektik. Das Verhältnis von ‘Herrschaft’ und ‘Knechtschaft’ bei He-
gel und Marx 2nd ed. (Kohlhammer, Berlin-Köln-Mainz, 1972). See also J. SEI-
FERT, Überwindung des Skandals der reinen Vernunft cit., Superación del escándalo 
de la razón pura cit.
21. CAJETAN (TOMMASO DE VIO), De nominum analogia, in Scripta philosophica, 6 
Bände; herausgegeben von P. Zammit, M.-H. Laurent und J. Coquelle (Institu-
tum Angelicum, Romae, 1934-1939).
22. I have tried to reconcile the Scotist thesis that the concepts that refer to pure 
perfections, transcendentals, and categories, are “univocally used”, with the 
position of Aquinas that (ontologically speaking) there can be only analogy be-
tween fi nite and infi nite beings and substances. See J. SEIFERT, Essere e persona 
cit., ch. 7.
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tal properties” characterize entities of all categories and have been 
designated, for example, as the following seven:23
1. Ens (or “a being”: id quod est) that possesses being (esse) (a 
being that is ising, as Wilhelmsen expresses himself).24 Being as the 
“to be” or existing, esse, does not coincide with the entity, the ens, 
that possesses esse. Nor does it coincide with the latter’s essence (res).
2. res (essence), the what and how a being is; there is some kind 
of trinity between ens, esse, and essentia, so that the fi rst two tran-
scendentals include actually three: besides that which is (ens) also its 
essence (res, essentia) and its esse (existence).25
3. It is likewise a transcendental property of each thing that 
each and every entity is aliquid —something as opposed to nothing, 
non nihil; each being as well must have a proper identity of its own, 
and hence is distinct from everything else: it is an aliud quid (some-
thing else). Moreover, 
4. Each being is unum (one) —some kind of unity that is a 
united whole of moments and elements and is also one in virtue of 
the kind to which it belongs, as well as in virtue of its individual this-
ness; all this makes each being to be a certain, however weak, unity, 
a “one”. Each being of any category is also:
5. A verum (intelligible);
6. A bonum (good, bearer of some value); and 
23. See THOMAS AQUINAS, Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, in Opera Omnia (ut sunt 
in indice thomistico additis 61 scriptis ex aliis medii aevi auctoribus) 7 Bde, ed. 
Roberto Busa S. J. (Frommann-Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1980) vol. 
III, 1-186, q. 1. Following Thomas and Thomists such as Gredt, transcenden-
tals have been studied in a deeply phenomenological way by E. STEIN, Endliches 
und Ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstiegs zum Sinne des Seins, in Edith Steins Werke, 
Bd. II, 3rd ed. (Herder, Freiburg, 1986). I have developed some of these investi-
gations further in J. SEIFERT, Essence and Existence cit., Sein und Wesen cit., Essere 
e persona cit., ch. 5-7.
24. See F. D. WILHELMSEN, The Paradoxical Structure of Existence (University of 
Dallas Press, Irving, 1970).
25. These very diffi cult questions I have treated extensively in J. SEIFERT, Essence 
and Existence cit., Sein und Wesen cit., ch. 1 and 2. See also J. HERING, Bemerkun-
gen über das Wesen, die Wesenheit und die Idee, 2. Aufl . (Reihe, Darmstadt, 1968), 
H. SPIEGELBERG, Über das Wesen der Idee. Eine ontologische Untersuchung, “Jahr-
buch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung” XI (1930) 1-238; R. 
INGARDEN, Essentiale Fragen, “Jahrbuch für Phänomenologie und phänomeno-
logische Forschung” VII (1924) 125-304, Über das Wesen. Hrsg. von Peter Mc-
Cormick (Universitätsverlag Winter, Heidelberg, 2007).
ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 47/2 (2014) 315-356
ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES: ON THEIR DISTINCTION
329
7. A pulchrum (beautiful, i.e., possessing some kind of meta-
physical or aesthetic beauty).
Duns Scotus has revolutionized the philosophy of these tran-
scendentals, calling “transcendental” not only and not primarily 
what is common to all things of all categories but calling “transcen-
dental” any pure perfection (1) which to possess or to be is abso-
lutely better than anything incompatible with it. Such pure perfec-
tions are (2) not essentially limited to a fi nite form or category and 
hence can be infi nite and therefore be in God. (3) All these pure 
perfections must also be compatible with all others, which follows 
logically from their fi rst and foremost characteristic (1). We can 
identify four groups of these transcendental properties of being in 
Scotus’s understanding of which the transcendentals in the common 
sense discussed above is only one group:
a. The mentioned transcendentals which are common to every 
being and therefore must also be in the infi nite being;
b. Pure perfections that exist only in some beings in the world 
(such as life, intellect, justice) but likewise “can be infi nite in some-
thing” and are only fully themselves in their infi nite form;
c. Exclusively divine perfections that exist only in God such as 
absolute infi nity of goodness, necessary real existence etc.
d. What Duns Scotus calls the “disjunctive transcendentals”, 
i.e. that each being must be or have one side of an infi nite series of 
pairs of contradictory opposites.26
3. “TRANSCENDENTAL” ARE, THIRDLY, THE FIRST PRINCIPLES, i.e., states 
of affairs or “laws” which apply to all things of any category, such as:
(1) the ontological principle of identity which refers to the state of 
affairs and law that every being of any category and kind is identi-
cal with itself, thus having a unique relationship to itself: “it’s being 
itself”, which is closely related to the transcendental property “al-
iquid”, not in its sense of non nihil (not nothing), but in its sense of 
aliud quid (of being something distinct from other things and not 
being something else).
26. See A. WOLTER, op. cit., and J. SEIFERT, Essere e persona cit., ch. 5.
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(2) the principle of (non-)contradiction in the ontological sense, ac-
cording to which nothing can be and not be at the same time and 
in the same sense, in relation to the same, etc.; nothing can have a 
property and not have it in the same sense, or at the same time, etc., 
and no state of affairs can coexist with its contradictorily opposite 
state of affairs.
This ontological principle of (non-)contradiction is quite dif-
ferent from, and irreducible to, both the principle of identity and 
the third transcendental principle of being:
(3) The principle of excluded middle in the ontological sense consists 
in that it is impossible for anything neither to be nor not to be in the 
same determinate sense. This principle does not require the time-
restriction of the principles of identity and contradiction because 
something either is or is not and there is no third possibility at all 
times and at any different time; different times allow for the (non-
simultaneous) lack of total identity as well as for the realization of 
contradictory states of affairs. Things can have, at different times, a 
predicate P and not P, a fact that is the condition of the possibility 
of every becoming. But neither at the same nor at different times 
can an X neither be nor not be.27 
(4) Among the fi rst transcendental ontological principles that 
transcend all categorial genera of being is also a fourth one, the 
principle of suffi cient reason that consists in the necessary state of 
27. The problem of how this principle seems to be contradicted by fi ctional objects, 
as for example when we say that the witch in Grimm’s fairy tale Hänsel and 
Gretel neither has red hair nor not red hair, can be solved once we understand 
the infi nitely many “indeterminacy spots” in represented fi ctional objects that 
are never completely determined (determinate) by the imagination of an artist, 
in contrast to the real world that has no such “indeterminacy spots”, at least not 
in the present and past. In fi ctional objects, however, there are infi nitely many 
indeterminate aspects of which it is true to say that the imaginary and indeter-
minate S neither is P nor not P. Roman Ingarden has shown this masterfully in 
his R. INGARDEN, The Literary Work of Art. Transl. by George G. Grabowicz 
(Northwestern University Press, Evanston, 1973), and in his R. INGARDEN, Der 
Streit um die Existenz der Welt. Bd. I. Existentialontologie. Bd. II, 1, Formalon-
tologie, 1. Teil (Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1964-1965). Aristotle argues in his Perí 
Hermeneias (De Interpretatione) that also the future is intrinsically indeterminate 
and therefore there is no present or past truth about future contingents. See C. 
W. A. WHITAKER, Aristotle’s De Interpretatione: Contradiction and Dialectic (Clar-
endon Press, Oxford, 1996).
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affairs that there always must be some reason, within or outside 
anything, why it is rather than not being, and why it is the way it is 
and none other. Also this principle, which must be sharply distin-
guished from the thesis that this suffi cient reason must be a neces-
sary reason (a claim Leibniz makes), is a fi rst and “transcendental” 
principle of all being in the sense that nothing, absolutely nothing, 
can exist without a reason that may lie within it or outside of it. 
This is evidently true, even though the concrete nature of such 
a reason may be extremely different in different things: ranging 
from strictly necessary reasons to completely arbitrary and whimsi-
cal decisions of free agents which are suffi cient to explain why some 
senseless actions occur.
Also effi cient causes are part of the suffi cient reason. And yet, 
the principle of suffi cient reason is much wider than the principle 
of causality; for the latter by no means refers to every being, but only 
to every change and contingent being, requiring an effi cient cause 
of it. The notion of reason is not only wider than that of effi cient 
cause, however, but is also much wider than a notion of cause that 
includes all four Aristotelian and additional personal causes not dis-
cussed by Aristotle: it not only includes also fi nal causes, material 
causes, formal and exemplary causes, but many further causes and 
reasons why something is. For example the reason (formal cause) 
of a mathematical state of affairs, or the reasons why an absolute 
being exists, are quite different from the four Aristotelian and other 
personal causes, even though some philosophers might be inclined 
to say that any reason that lies within the nature and essence of a 
being is a case of “formal causality”. If the notion of “formal cause” 
includes all reasons that lie within the essence of a thing, or in the 
necessary connection between essence and existence in the absolute 
being, many further reasons may be called “formal causes”. This 
does not apply, however, to all further reasons. For instance, the 
character of “formal causality” must not be attributed to the causal-
ity by which an agent brings forth his own free actions.28 On the 
level of persons, in cognition, logical reasoning, motives for human 
28. See further explanations in J. SEIFERT, In Defense of Free Will: A Critique of Ben-
jamin Libet, “Review of Metaphysics” LXV/2 (2011) 377-407.
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actions and attitudes, we fi nd many further reasons and causes that 
cannot be subsumed under any of the Aristotelian four or other 
causes that do not necessarily entail persons.29
The four fi rst ontological principles are states of affairs and in 
a sense “necessary laws” that apply to everything that is regardless of 
the category or mode of being within which it falls. As such they are 
not identical with the propositions which state them (let alone with 
the sentences that express these propositions) but with the objects 
of these propositions (Sätze) that affi rm these fi rst principles but are 
not identical with them. The fi rst ontological principles themselves 
are not sentences or propositions but ontological laws or states of 
affairs which possess necessity in themselves and at the same time 
are necessary laws for all modes and categories of being and for each 
individual thing. 
2. Categories are not Modes (Modalities) of Being in the strict sense
A. What are “modes of being”?
Besides categories there is another and even more primary division 
within being that is, I suggest, clearly prior to categories, namely the 
“modes of being”, especially the following fi ve ones:
1. Real being.
2. Ideal being.
3. Purely logical being such as concepts and propositions.
4. Purely intentional being (for example, fi ctional objects and 
objectivities represented in literary works of art).
5. Possible being and possible worlds which are not absolutely 
nothing as can be seen when we consider their opposite: impossible 
worlds.30
29. See J. SEIFERT, Persons and Causes: Beyond Aristotle, “Journal of East-West 
Thought” 3/2 (2012) 1-32.
30. R. INGARDEN, Der Streit um die Existenz der Welt cit., distinguishes only four 
modes of being (3 of which coincide with ours) and also calls them categories: 
the real (spatio-temporal being), the ideal (abstract), the absolute (completely 
independent, atemporal), and purely intentional (consciousness-dependent). R. 
GROSSMANN, op. cit., rejects modes of being entirely (pp. 5-10).
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In this section, I wish to show that not only the “transcenden-
tals” but likewise what we could call the fi ve modes of being and the 
ontological modes of the states of affairs that we fi nd in relation to 
these modes of being, fall beyond the categories. Modalities of being 
such as reality-possibility-necessity-contingency can be found in, 
and affect, all categories of being and hence cannot be considered 
categories themselves. In his list of twelve categories, larger and 
different from Aristotle’s ten, Kant includes some of these modes 
of being (namely 1: reality, and 5: possibility)31 among his categories, 
without noticing clearly the very different kinds of things he calls, 
at this point, categories.32
For while the modes of being characterize vast spheres of infi -
nitely many “inhabitants”, just as vast or even vaster than categories, 
they differ from the categories in the following ways:
B. The fi rst mode of being: categories can and must be 
attributed primarily to real being, whether it be sensible or spiritual, 
whereas there are many other modes of being to which variations 
of the same, and some new categories apply.
Thus this primary mode of being, reality, is in no way on the same 
level as the categories which fi nd themselves within it. If one calls 
this primary mode of being, the real world, a category, one changes 
31. These belong to Kant’s three —with their opposites six— “modal categories”: 
possibility-impossibility; existence-non-existence; necessity-contingency, as 
well as to the fi rst of the three qualitative categories: reality; negation, limitation.
32. Besides, Kant criticizes Aristotle’s list sharply because he regards them as an 
unsystematic and accidental classifi cation without a unifi ed principle, and 
also claims that the list sins against the correct one both through excess and 
through defect. R. ROVIRA, ¿Una lista desordenada y defectuosa? Consideraciones 
sobre la crítica de Kant al elenco aristotélico de las categorías, “Anuario fi losófi co” 
XXXIX/3 (2006) 747-767. has offered an excellent and thoughtful critique 
that shows that both objections of Kant rest in part on a lack of understand-
ing Aristotle correctly (ignoring the four distinctions and the principles that 
underlie his list of categories and have been explained in different ways by 
ancient, medieval, and renaissance commentators). Rovira likewise shows that 
Kant introduces and rejects some categories and addresses his “objection of 
excess and defect” to Aristotle on the basis of an subjective idealism that was 
wholly foreign to Aristotle.
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the notion of category in the direction of a more comprehensive 
concept of categories the content of which loses through this en-
largement of its extension the specifi city of the content of the term 
“categories”. While the categories of being fi nd their most charac-
teristic and primary realization within the fi rst mode of being: real 
being, real being itself is not a category such as substance, for example. 
Within the real world of oceans and mountains, plants, animals 
and persons, colors, movements, and sounds, we fi nd beings of all 
categories such that their “being real” must be designated as their 
mode of being, but not as a category. For, while differing from other 
modalities of being (possible, fi ctional, ideal and conceptual ones), 
the ontic mode (modality) of real being is more foundational than 
the categories: it is not itself a genus of beings or entities, however, 
but as it were contains innumerable entities of all categories within 
itself, yet in a different sense of “containing” than for example space 
and time contain things.
A. Besides, while the proper understanding of many categories of 
being requires that we understand them (for example substances) to 
be the highest genera of real beings, nevertheless it is true that dif-
ferent categories of being are also found in other modes of being, 
for example there are also substances and persons, as well as quali-
ties and actions in novels, though these are not truly substances and 
persons but merely imagined or represented ones. Nevertheless, 
also these purely intentional and fi ctional beings fall under different 
categories. For example, Don Quixote is a substance, the pale color 
of his face is not. There are also ideal essences of man as well as 
of virtues. There are likewise possible substances, possible persons, 
possible actions, etc. in possible worlds which are toto coelo different 
from the corresponding real beings in virtue of that unique inner 
actuality if real existence: the actus essendi.33 
33. On the unique interior act of being see J. SEIFERT, Sein und Wesen cit., ch. 2. While 
possible worlds come close to being nothing, they, let alone ideal essences, are 
not absolutely nothing. Fictional worlds (purely intentional objects) and logical 
entities are even less nothing. In this respect I have considerable differences 
with the masterwork of Millán-Puelles: A. MILLÁN-PUELLES, Teoría del objeto 
puro (Rialp, Madrid, 1990), The Theory of the Pure Object, transl. by Jorge García-
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B. Several categories can, in some sense, be attributed to entities 
of different modes of being, for example to real, fi ctional and pos-
sible worlds. Thus the modal worlds themselves (in the sense of 2A)
are, in one sense, a more foundational division within being than 
the categories; for they affect and change the “same categories” in 
a most radical way (for example being responsible for the abysmal 
difference between real and possible substances, causes, crimes, and 
persons). On the other hand, as modal categories (in the sense 2B) 
that both cut across and are found within each of the modally dif-
ferent worlds, they are in a sense more universal than the different 
modes of being because they are not confi ned to one of them.
C. By constituting fundamentally different spheres of being, the modes
of being or modal worlds (in the sense 2A) clearly differ from tran-
scendental being and from the transcendental properties of being 
per se, which do not only apply to all categories but also to all modes 
of being. (There are, however, important distinctions in this regard 
and in the application of the fi rst transcendental ontological prin-
ciples when we come to the world of “purely intentional objects”). 
The distinct modes of being could rather be regarded as a more 
fundamentally different and simultaneously more abstract sort of 
division within being than the categories. Some of the same “onto-
logical categories” are encountered (though radically distinctly) in 
all modes of being such that the modes of being do not themselves 
constitute new classes or highest genera of being, and hence are not 
categories. 
Inasmuch as the subject-matter of general ontology and meta-
physics comprises what is common and prior to all categorial dis-
tinctions (namely the transcendental being, properties and princi-
ples, as well as the modes of being), it certainly does not coincide 
Gómez (Universitätsverlag C. Winter, Heidelberg, 1995). See J. SEIFERT, Preface 
to A. MILLÁN-PUELLES, The Theory of the Pure Object cit., 1-12; El papel de las 
irrealidades para los principios de contradicción y de razón suffi ciente, in J. A. IBÁÑEZ-
MARTÍN (coord.), Realidad e irrealidad. Estudios en homenaje al Profesor Antonio 
Millán-Puelles (Rialp, Madrid, 2001), 119-152; Wahrheit und Person. Vom Wesen 
der Seinswahrheit, Erkenntniswahrheit und Urteilswahrheit. De veritate – Über die 
Wahrheit Bd. I (Ontos-Verlag, Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New 
Brunswick, 2009).
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with the categories but includes themes of an even more founda-
tional signifi cance.
One should then distinguish categories as highest genera of be-
ings (primarily of beings found in the real world), such as the ten Ar-
istotelian categories and some other ones, from modal categories (in 
the second sense of 2B), that are not categories strictly speaking. But 
if one wanted, by way of enlarging the notion of category, to add all 
modal ontological categories towards a maximal list of categories, 
these would include many more, for example temporal modalities 
such as future, past and present being, and negative modalities such 
as impossibility, irreality, etc.
D. If one were to accept a list of categories that include also modal 
categories and are found (differentiated) by the modes of being, one 
ought to distinguish at least two kinds of modal ontological categories:
a. The primary modes or modalities of being constitute whole 
worlds of ontologically speaking radically different spheres of being 
such as the fi ve just mentioned above: for example the real world, 
possible worlds, and the world of purely intentional objects (fi ctions, 
etc.), of which we are just explaining why they ought not be called 
categories. Within each of these modes of being, however, the dif-
ferent categories take on quite different senses, between which there 
are such big dissimilarities that for example between a substance 
in the real world and an ideal (intelligible) (abstract or secondary) 
substance there is only analogy or even homonymy, as Plotinus has 
affi rmed. Neither one of the modes of being is a category in our 
sense because they are not highest genera of being; (possible worlds 
are even closer to nothingness than to being).
b. One could likewise call modal ontological categories those 
modal characteristics that do not depend on whole modal realms 
or worlds (such as the real world, fi ctional, possible worlds, etc.), 
but constitute different modalities within one and the same modal 
world. In this second sense, one may apply modal categories to enti-
ties or states of affairs within one and the same fundamental modal-
ity of being. For example within the real world one could distinguish 
contingent from necessary beings, real possibilities and potentiali-
ties from the corresponding actualities.
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C. The Second Mode of being
Within the second mode of being, the ideal beings and the world 
of eternal “essences” or “ideas”, the situation is again quite differ-
ent and far more complicated: for here we fi nd, when we refl ect 
more carefully on that part of ideal being that we call the “ideal 
essences” or purely ideal essential forms of real beings, categories 
in an ontic mode entirely different from categories and essences as 
they constitute the most general categorial structures or forms of 
real entities and essences. We come to recognize that ideal categories 
(ideal “essences”) neither are nor actually possess the essences of the 
categories of which they are ideas. They are much rather “ideas” or 
“essential plans” for essences and categories, while these themselves 
(co-)constitute a very general layer of the essences and reality of real 
beings. Ideal essences and categories do also not mean, as concepts 
do, the essences and categories as they exist in real things, nor are 
they mere entia rationis, as concepts may be conceived to be:34 ideal 
essences and categories are not meaning-units formed by the intel-
lect in order to refer to essences and categories in thought; they are 
much rather “models”, plans or archetypes, often (especially in the 
ethical sphere) far more sublime and noble ones than the essences 
of and in real beings that exist in the real contingent world; they 
are “essential reasons (plans)” for the essences of those real entities, 
material or spiritual things, that exemplify or embody these ideas. 
The ideal essences and ideal (intelligible) categories themselves have 
their own ideal being, but at the same time they are geared towards 
the real world that constitutes the primary mode of their being and 
realization. Ideal “essences” and “categories” are not an empty du-
plication of the world but a most important eternal archetype and 
exemplary cause of it.35
34. I express myself carefully here because I have argued that the thesis of the creation 
and constitution of conceptual meanings defended by A. PFÄNDER, Logik 4th 
ed. (Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, Heildelberg, 2000) is questionable. See J. 
SEIFERT, Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man?, “Review of Metaphysics” 
35 (1982) 461-482, Wahrheit und Person cit., ch. 4 and 5.
35. Putting these terms in quotation marks follows a suggestion I made in my 
detailed analysis of ideal versus real essences in J. SEIFERT, Essence and Existence 
cit., ch. 1; Sein und Wesen cit., ch. 1.
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Now we have here to distinguish certainly “categories as ideas” 
from categories in and of real entities. For example the ontologi-
cal category of substance (or what substance really is) cannot exist 
in its proper reality and essence as universal essence and idea, but 
only in and of individual beings that embody and exemplify the es-
sence of substance. On the other hand, this common nature of a 
substance, for example as “essential plan” of man, certainly exists 
independently of whether it is concretely embodied, perfectly or 
imperfectly, in real substances (real men). Categories as ideas do not 
exist in concrete entities, as their real essences or more precisely as 
the categorial layers or strata of their essences in them do. They are 
not essences in and of things, but precisely the “ideas” of these es-
sences and categories. Now we can see that of any universal includ-
ing categories, at least if they are “of something”, it is true that they 
exist only in those things that have this essence. Thus the “category” 
of substance does not have actual being in the idea of substance, but 
dwells only in the real and individual beings of which the idea (ideal 
essence) of substance is an idea.
In this regard, and in spite of the deep difference of ideas from 
concepts and other logical entities such as propositions, the way 
in which the “categories” are represented in the world of ideas is 
somewhat similar to the way in which concepts refer to ontological 
categories without possessing these themselves.
D. The Third Mode of Being (“purely logical being”), 
the Difference between logical and Ontological Categories, 
and three kinds of “Logical Categories”
Distinct from ontological categories as most general kinds of being 
are the logical categories. The purely conceptual-logical being of concepts, 
propositions, etc. does not fall under the same ontological categories 
of being which are the highest genera of real beings and are echoed 
by fi ctional and possible beings. Logical meaning-unities are not 
substances, qualities, etc. They are of three entirely different kinds:
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I. Praedicabilia
All that can be predicated of a thing (the predicabilia) could be called 
logical categories; in that sense, for example, accidents can be predi-
cated of the substances that have them, and —in another sense— the 
famous deutera ousía (substance taken abstractly) can be predicated 
of all concrete substances; for example we can say that this ox is a 
substance, whereas the fi rst substance (prote ousía), namely this indi-
vidual ox, cannot be predicated of anything else. Logical categories in 
the sense of praedicabilia, however, are rather ontological categories 
taken as individual accidents or as general nature of the ontological 
category of substance, and then both can indeed be predicated of indi-
vidual substances. One might say that these are ontological categories 
(or individual accidents of a given category) understood as they are 
meant and predicated via logical concepts and propositions.
II. Classes of concepts and word-meanings that mean ontological 
categories: Derivative logical categories distinct only in virtue 
of the ontological categories they mean
Concepts and word-meanings cannot be predicated of any real 
being. We can mean (with Aristotle, though he does not sharply 
distinguish them from ontological categories of being) “logical 
categories” to be the concepts which mean ontological categories with-
out instantiating them: the logical categories of substance-concepts, 
quality-concepts, quantity-concepts, for example, are not substances, 
quantities, qualities, etc., but the logical categories that correspond 
to these ontological categories. They are the classes of meaning-
units and concepts which mean these ontological categories, without 
being them; concepts neither contain nor are subject to these dif-
ferent ontological categories; for example substance-concepts are 
not themselves in any sense of the term substances (in contradis-
tinction to possible and fi ctional beings which are —albeit in an 
entirely different mode— substances, persons, or accidents: for 
example Don Quixote in Cervantes’ novel is a personal substance, 
Rozinante a horse, i.e., an animal substance, the noise in the tavern 
or the color of the hair and face of Maritorne, are neither one of 
those, but pure accidents).
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As concepts, their being would not be categorically differenti-
ated but basically be of the same kind: meaning-units; and in no way 
could we attribute to them the marks that characterize beings of the 
different ontological categories meant by them: substance-concepts, 
for example, are not substances, action-concepts are not actions, etc. 
Thus this their fi rst categorial difference, as logical categories, would 
stem entirely from their conceptual meaning-intentions being di-
rected at different ontological categories; these different conceptual 
meaning-intentions characterize them as concepts (as logically different 
meaning-units) and are correlated to ontological categories, but do 
not render the concepts themselves ontologically different. 
III. Distinct Logical categories qua logical entities
Thirdly, there are properly logical categories which are not derived 
from ontological categories meant by concepts, but which belong to 
the sphere of concepts and other logical entities as such; these are quite 
different from the discussed ontological categories but equally differ-
ent from the second kind of logical categories (and their difference 
that is purely derived from their objects). The term “logical category” 
here refers to concepts not inasmuch as they are different in terms of 
the objects they mean but inasmuch as they are different qua concepts. 
The difference from the second kind of logical categories is particu-
larly clear when we consider that some of these logical categories of 
concepts characterize concepts that do not mean any object but are, 
as Pfänder puts it, purely functional concepts, such as the copula in its 
multiple function of (always) relating a predicate to a subject, while 
exerting many other kinds of functions (such as affi rming, asking, wish-
ing and other functions) leading to different objective logical thoughts 
or “categories of thought”: judgments, questions, wishes, etc.
If we consider the fi rst genera of elements of objective thoughts 
and logical entia, we could call the following things logical catego-
ries, i.e., the highest genera of logical entities:
A. Concepts or, as most general category of logical entities, and, as 
sub-categories: Fundamentally different classes (categories) of con-
cepts such as
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a. substantive concepts,
b. adjectival concepts,
c. verbal or action-concepts,
d. purely functional concepts such as the copula, etc.36
B. Propositions (i.e., higher and more complex conceptual formations 
and objective “thoughts”) in the wider sense (that do not coincide 
with judgments but comprise them as one of their species); and as 
sub-categories: the different meaning structures of different objec-
tive thoughts and complex logical meaning-structures, determined 
by the different functions of the copula in them: questions, wishes, 
commands, judgments (which are bearers of the entirety of the truth 
of judgments37), etc.
C. Reasonings (inferences, arguments) which possess such attributes as 
validity or invalidity, soundness or unsoundness, etc., and as sub-
categories, for example:
Deductive reasonings (syllogisms) and inductive inferences; and 
of the former further sub-categories such as categorical, hypothetical 
and disjunctive syllogisms, and their subdivisions and mixed forms.
E. The Fourth mode of being: that of purely 
intentional objects, such as Don Quixote and Sancho Pansa, 
Odysseus or Hamlet
With this fourth mode of being the situation is again quite different 
with respect to categories. For here substances and all other catego-
ries of being do appear: there are substances and accidents, persons 
and animals, living and life-less things, white-haired and black-
haired women, etc. in novels and dramas; but all of these occur in 
36. A. PFÄNDER, Logik 4th ed. (Universitätsverlag Carl Winter, Heildelberg, 2000), 
Logic, transl. from the third unaltered edition by Donald Ferrari (Ontos-Verlag, 
Frankfurt / Paris / Ebikon / Lancaster / New Brunswick, 2009) has studied pro-
foundly these different logical categories or highest genera of logical meanings 
(logical entities).
37. See J. SEIFERT, Is the Existence of Truth dependent upon Man? cit., Wahrheit und 
Person cit., ch. 4-5.
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the world of fi ction, in a King Lear or an Odyssey, in a purely irreal 
mode and sense, i.e., as purely intentional objects of something that would 
solely in the real world actually be what in the fi ctional world it merely 
“pretends to be” or is “represented to be”. In a way similar to the 
fi ctional “things” also the fi ctional states of affairs (“the-being-[or 
not-being]-y-of-an-X”) that are part of the world of “represented 
objectivities” of a novel or drama are present in the fi ctional world 
just as in the real world —and yet: through their radical dependence 
on conscious intentional acts the fi ctional states of affairs undergo 
a profound ontological change that depends on the different mode 
of being to which they belong. When compared to states of affairs 
that belong to the real world, they are like pure nothings and yet, 
once constituted by conscious acts or by the meaning-units that are 
part of a literary work of art, they are something, which is obvious 
when we consider that there are true and false judgments about Don 
Quixote or King Lear and on the events that take place in them.38
From the fi ctional states of affairs that are only purely inten-
tional objects of acts of Cervantes, Shakespeare or of their read-
ers, and also from the “objectifi ed intentional objects” and states 
of affairs of the sort Ingarden described so well in his theory of 
the “stratum of represented objectivities” in The Literary Work of 
Art,39 we must distinguish the real states of affairs regarding the 
fi ctional world, for example the states of affairs that exist regarding 
each character and event and chapter of a literary work of art and 
that are entirely real states of affairs about fi ction.
38. This is of course, at least in a traditional orthodox reading of them, quite dif-
ferent in literary and simultaneously historical works such as the books Esther, 
Tobias, or Job of the Old Testament, and again different in parables which, 
while not describing real judges, prodigal sons, fathers, owners of vineyards, 
kings, etc., but which have such a direct message for the real world that we can 
in no way treat them as “pure fi ction”. Even when pure fi ction reaches a certain 
depth, one might with good reason deny that it is “pure fi ction” or that the 
represented objectivities in a literary work of art are purely intentional objects 
without direct relation and assertions about the real world.
39. R. INGARDEN, The Literary Work of Art cit., J. SEIFERT, Ingarden’s Theory of the 
Quasi-Judgment. An exposition of Its Logical Aspects and a Critical Evaluation of Its 
Value in the Context of Understanding the Literary Work of Art, in A. WĉGRZECKI 
(ed.), Roman Ingarden a fi lozofi a naszego czasu (Polskie Towarzystwo Filozofi czne, 
Kraków, 1995).
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When we think of these real states of affairs about fi ctional 
works and the omnipresence of states of affairs in all inhabitants of 
all fi ve modalities, regarding all possible, conceptual, etc. objects, we 
might subsume these states of affairs or this omnipresent character-
istic of the states of affairs to the transcendental level, and regard 
“states of affairs” likewise as a “transcendental”. Inasmuch as they 
are present in all modes and categories of being and also include all 
negative states of affairs of the non-being of something, states of af-
fairs possess a similar type of “transcendental” universality of “being 
present in all things, all modes of being and categories”, and hence 
being themselves prior to all modes and genera of beings.
On the other hand, inasmuch as states of affairs are as it were 
part of the worlds that correspond to the fi ve modes of being, they 
assume themselves the different character of the respective mode of 
being, for example there are fi ctional states of affairs that appear in the 
literary work and partake in the irreality of the fi ctional world. There 
are also real states of affairs, however, many of which come to be and 
pass away in time and participate in the actuality of the real world. 
There are likewise states of affairs that are meant by logical mean-
ing-units such as quasi-judgments40 and are, as it were, “projected by 
them”, and these projected states of affairs take part (though in a very 
different way from the ideal, fi ctional and real states of affairs) in the 
mode of purely logical entities, of a being of which they are in a cer-
tain way, being their object, also part. Here we must distinguish the 
states of affairs that are meant by logical propositions and reasonings 
but are real, fi ctional, or ideal states of affairs, and purely logical states 
of affairs that entail logical entities and concepts as members and are 
parts of logic. For example, the logical principle of contradiction is 
a law that refers to the logical meaning-units of two contradictory 
propositions and excludes that both be true. On the other hand, the 
state of affairs projected and affi rmed by the proposition “the sun is 
hot” is not any logical law or state of affairs. The concepts contained 
in this proposition and the proposition as a whole do not speak about 
logical entities; on the contrary, the subject and predicate to which 
40. On this term see R. INGARDEN, The Literary Work of Art cit.; see also J. SEIFERT, 
Ingarden’s Theory of the Quasi-Judgment cit.
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the subject-concept and predicate-concept of this proposition direct 
their meaning-intentions, and the corresponding states of affairs 
themselves to which this and similar propositions refer, may be part 
of the fi ctional, possible, or real world but are in no way of logical 
nature or belong to the sphere of logical entities or laws such as the 
laws of valid and invalid syllogisms.
F. The fi fth mode of Being: Possibilities and Possible worlds
We have already touched this issue from several points of view but 
cannot and need not, in this limited essay, deepen the topic and the 
transformation categories of possible world objects undergo. I just wish 
to stress again that there are not only infi nitely many true but also false 
statements about possible objects and possible worlds (for example de-
claring what is really, or just what is logically, possible “impossible,” or 
on the contrary, declaring what is objectively impossible “possible.”)
Already this single fact shows that possibilities are something 
and not nothing and have a certain autonomy with respect to our 
knowledge and judgment. This applies even to possible worlds 
much more than to fi ctional objects and worlds.
3. Lower Genera of Beings and Individuals are not Categories
Now one could think that only the most abstract and universal tran-
scendental properties, fi rst principles and the less abstract modes of 
being (that still exceed the level of abstractness of the categories) fall 
outside the realm of the categories, but this is not so.
On the contrary, there is another, in a sense a reverse, contrast 
to the categories, namely lower genera of being and individuals.
A. No lower genera and species of beings that are not the most general and 
highest ones are categories, for example:
1. Color (which is a kind of the higher category of quality);
2. Red;
3. Bordeau-red, and
4. All infi nitely many nuances of the color red;
5. Individual red spots.
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None of them and innumerable others are categories in the rigorous 
sense of the term. Thus, apart from the higher and highest levels of 
universality of the transcendentals and modes of being, there are the 
innumerable lower levels of universals and kinds of being that differ 
from categories. Thus it is already a question whether such general 
essences as “living beings” (life) or “personal beings” (persons), or 
“consciousness” are categories, but certainly the genera of “mam-
mals”, “reptiles”, “birds”, etc. are not categories, i.e., they are not 
in any sense the most universal genera of being. These essences, let 
alone lower ones, for example that of a specifi c shade of red, fall-
ing under more general essences such as light red, and even more 
general essences such as redness as such, the latter falling under 
color, are not highest kinds and hence no ontological categories. 
We might be tempted to call color as such a category under which 
all the distinct colors and color shades fall. But “color”, while being 
the highest genus within that fundamental datum (urphenomenon) 
called by that word “color”, can only be called a “category” if we 
change that notion.41 For we understand that color is an accident, 
and a specifi c accident of a special kind (quality); and hence not a 
highest genus. There are, in the strict sense, no higher genera of 
which the categories would be subdivisions. They are precisely 
the most general kinds of beings. Therefore no species of a higher 
genus of being is a category.
A phenomenologist might contend that each irreducible gen-
eral urphenomenon, at least the highest genus of it (in our case color), 
is a category inasmuch as it cannot be derived from some higher 
genus by adding a “specifi c difference”. Color cannot be derived 
from “quality” in virtue of a specifi c difference, precisely because 
it is an ultimate irreducible urphenomenon that is not the result of 
combining other data.
Nonetheless, “color” is not a category properly speaking; for it 
still belongs to a more universal class of being: it is a quality and hence 
not a category in the strict sense. For the highest genera of beings are 
precisely not species of higher genera; and it is precisely their charac-
41. This applies even much more if such things as “night” and “dusk” (getting dark) 
are called categories, as by J. CUMPA, Sobre la expresión cit.
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ter of being themselves the highest genera of being that entitles us to 
give to those distinct data a special name: namely that of “categories”.
This does not forbid us to introduce another, less rigorous no-
tion of category. 
Some metaphysicians want to call also the mentioned data cat-
egories. There is no reason that would absolutely forbid enlarging 
the list of ontological categories in order to achieve a maximal ex-
tension of the term (far beyond what is called Aristotle’s maximal 
list of the —ten— categories, to which some interpreters, like Kant, 
add the fi ve postpraedicabilia added by Aristotle in the last chapters 
of his Categories, thus attributing fi fteen categories to him).42 In that 
case, however, one has to be clear about introducing a very differ-
ent understanding of ontological categories and of what a category 
generally speaking is. One would no longer mean by “categories” 
the highest genera of being which are no species or species-like 
subdivisions of other genera but would, for example, call categories 
any general essence of great impact even if it can in some sense be 
classifi ed as a class of higher universals. Its investigation into irre-
ducible urphenomena of such archetypical and irreducible essences 
as that of personhood or of color may make a phenomenologist 
refuse to classify such central irreducible data as persons, as a simple 
subdivision of substances or “color” a simple subdivision of qual-
ity, but would see their irreducibility to any other essence, together 
with their fundamental importance, as suffi cient ground of reckon-
ing them among the categories. 
Therefore in a perfectly legitimate, though looser application 
of the term, we may speak of “categories” of importance, categories 
of free acts, categories of love, etc.; but in these and similar cases 
the term “category” simply means a broad and general type of some-
thing else, not the highest kind but a sub-division of a given act or of 
a class of being, of the good (value), or a general viewpoint of human 
motivation. In such application, the term “category” does not mean 
one of the most universal and highest classes or genera of being, which 
42. R. ROVIRA, ¿Una lista desordenada y defectuosa? cit., 258 ff. offers convincing 
arguments why they should not be considered as “added categories” and why 
doing so results from a fundamental error and misunderstanding.
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are never species of higher ones, as the ontological categories in the 
strict sense do.
Besides excluding transcendentals, fi rst principles, and modes 
of being from the ontological categories, we therefore likewise have 
to exclude from their scope the many more specifi c essences includ-
ing those that, unlike genera and species of animals, are of greatest 
interest for metaphysics when it asks its central question “what is 
being in the most proper sense?”, such as: person, community, soul, 
each of which, however, constitutes a kind, however important, of 
higher kinds or different natures, wherefore they are not categories 
in the strictest sense of the term: that of highest genera which are 
not species or subdivisions of  higher (more abstract) genera.
B. No individuals including a single and supremely individual divine being 
are ontological categories. This directs our attention to another as-
pect and limit of the categories: being the highest kinds of being, 
they have the character of genera in contradistinction to individu-
als. For this reason, no essence of which there can only be just one 
(as in the case of God) and no single individual being is a category. 
Neither God, monotheistically understood, nor Peter nor Socrates, 
are categories, however rich their essences are, because they differ 
precisely from an essential feature of categories, their character of 
highest and universal genera of being.
One could argue, for example with Chisholm, that, even if not 
individuals and individual persons per se, the general term or datum 
of “individual” (individualness) and person(hood), is a category, yet 
even this assumption is doubtful because one might argue that, also 
taken generally, syncategorical expressions such as “this individual” 
do not designate any kind of being, just as the term “person” does 
not mean a sort of thing (it is not a “sortaler Begriff”) but individu-
als.43 At any rate, even if one disagrees with this view and claims, 
as I would, that also the terms “individualness” and “personhood” 
include elements of universal essences of personhood and individu-
ality, certainly the individual person, and in a less important sense, 
43. See R. SPAEMANN, Personen. Versuche über den Unterschied zwischen ‘etwas’ und 
‘jemand’ (Klett-Cotta, Stuttgart, 1996).
JOSEF SEIFERT
348 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 47/2 (2014) 315-356
any individual being as such is always unique and, in different de-
grees, unrepeatable, and therefore individuals and persons are not a 
genus of being and hence no category.44
Linked to this, also being (to be), at least in the real world whose 
inhabitants are always and only individuals, is a most individual level 
of being that falls outside the categories. Existence as well as essence 
have been called by medieval philosophers (transcendental) “prin-
ciples of being”, instead of categories; because they are constitutive 
elements of each real being rather than “kinds” of being. To exist is 
therefore, quite apart from the reason of its individual thisness, not a 
category. The actus essendi differs sharply from all categories that refer 
to kinds of things, and therefore seem to pertain principally or always 
to the order of essence, and not to existence (to the act of being) which 
precisely differs from all fi nite essences.
We intentionally used the term “seem to pertain to the level of 
essence”, because a claim that categories would exclusively relate to 
essences has to be disputed. It is false to claim that categories always 
belong to the order of essences. Instead, at closer consideration we see 
that categories are related neither to pure esse nor to pure essence, but 
instead to the domain of entia (beings): categories then are the most 
universal genera of entia, of that which is (id quod est) and has an essence.
Because of all the data that we must distinguish from categories 
and that yet clearly fall within the domain of ontology and meta-
physics, we cannot agree with the thesis of Jorge Gracia that meta-
physics, in its entirety, is the science of categories.45
II. A DEFINITIVE LIST OF ONTOLOGICAL CATEGORIES 
– A DISTANT GOAL OF FUTURE PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
1. Is Anything Wrong with, or Missing in, Aristotle’s Maximal List 
of Ten Categories?
If we want to determine a defi nitive list of the ontological categories 
as the highest genera of being and wish to fi nd out what these con-
44. See J. E. GRACIA, Individuality cit.
45. See J. SEIFERT, What is Metaphysics and What Its Tasks? cit., 21-45.
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cretely are, we may say, without providing a thorough analysis, that 
Aristotle’s minimal list of categories that recognizes only two on-
tological categories, two highest genera of being, namely substance 
and accidents, identifi es two highest kinds of being which are most 
certainly and evidently in no way sub-divisions of higher genera: (1) 
that which is “in something else” (accidents) and (2) that which is 
“not in something else” but in itself (substance). In this regard, this 
distinction is the simplest, most unambiguous, undoubtedly true 
and rigorous answer to the number of categories of being. Aristotle 
instead assumes that the most basic classes and highest genera of ac-
cidents, of which he numbers nine, are categories on their own; as a 
matter of fact: he does not reckon “accidents” as categories but only 
the highest genera of them. Aristotle’s maximal list of ten categories 
does not count “accidents” in general as a category but regards their 
different kinds as so important that not “accidents” as such, but 
much rather their fundamental kinds constitute categories, i.e., the 
highest genera of being. Aristotle thus identifi es ten most general 
genera of being —substance and nine categories of accidents:46
1. Substance
2. Quantity 
3. Quality
4. Relation
5. Somewhere (location)
6. When (time)
7. Being in a position.
8. Having
9. Acting (action); doing;
10. Passion (being acted upon).47
Notwithstanding its clarity and apparent completeness, Aristotle’s 
list of categories seems to entail a number of problems and omis-
sions. If one is willing to follow Aristotle’s list, one runs into vari-
46. Aristotle himself provided different lists of categories. See ARISTOTLE, 
Categories cit., 3-24. R. GROSSMANN, op. cit., who gives an entirely different list, 
defends the view that a list of categories must be complete.
47. ARISTOTLE, Categories cit., 1b25-2a4.
JOSEF SEIFERT
350 ANUARIO FILOSÓFICO 47/2 (2014) 315-356
ous diffi culties in establishing the number and concrete identity of 
categories:
1. This maximal list leaves fi rst the diffi cult question what then 
“accidents as such” are, if they are not a supreme genus of being. 
How can the single accident-categories Aristotle names be the 
“highest genera of being” which by defi nition cannot have a higher 
genus above them, but in fact do have such a higher and more uni-
versal genus of being above them, namely that of “accidents”? A 
deeper philosophical investigation than we can provide here would 
be necessary to answer this question.
2. If one poses the question of the list of categories not only 
with respect to sensible reality but also in relation to spiritual real 
beings, it emerges that some of the Aristotelian categories (for ex-
ample “where”) do not apply, which was part of the cause for the 
sharp critique of the Aristotelian list categories Plotinus made of 
them in his Enneads, VI, 1-3.48 The question whether Porphyrius’s 
attempt to achieve a reconciliation between Plotinus and Aristotle 
in his Isagoge succeeded would need deep further philosophical in-
vestigations.
3. Aristotle’s fails to distinguish between three kinds of catego-
ries; a) those that apply to material beings only (for example where), 
b) those which apply to temporal (including spiritual) things only 
(when), and c) those which apply to all beings, material and spiritual 
beings alike (for example substance, quality), which pose the new 
problem keenly observed by Plotinus, how we can use the same 
terms to designate the categories of the physical and of the spiritual 
world? This problem, and an absence of a clear concept of analogy, 
prompted him to offer two lists of categories, one for the sensible 
world, another one for the spiritual intelligible world.
4. Linked to this, Aristotle fails to discuss the question which 
of the categories only apply to innerworldly and limited beings, such 
as “where” and “when” and which constitute “pure perfections” that 
are absolutely better to possess than to lack and therefore apply also 
to the absolute, divine being, and admit of infi nity (which Aristotle 
denied of God), such as substance.
48. See PLOTINO, Enneadi cit., 1410-1619.
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5. A fi fth reason for the incompleteness of the Aristotelian list 
of categories consists in that he likewise ignores the question in 
which ways the categories also exist and undergo differentiations in 
the four modes of being that we have distinguished from the modal-
ity of the real world. Plotinus49 asks this question about the intelligi-
ble world of the Platonic Ideas and pure Spirits and comes up with 
the solution that in the intelligible world all (or at least some) of the 
categories that apply to the sensible world have to be eliminated and 
fi ve other ones introduced. But while this is an important question 
and critical thought on Aristotle’s list of categories, we ought to am-
plify Plotinus’s question and ask how the categories also apply (apart 
from the real world) also to possible worlds, to purely intentional 
objects, and to the being of purely logical entities and meaning-units 
or to possible worlds. It should be clear that any attempt to answer 
all of these questions in this short essay would be futile.
2. Have Later Philosophers Discovered New Categories not Considered 
by Aristotle?
In a number of later and contemporary discussions, especially since 
Meinong and Husserl, R. Grossmann, and many others, additional 
highest genera of being (categories) have been proposed that can-
not be subsumed under Aristotle’s ten categories, such as “state of 
affairs”, fact, process, whole, and set.50 
Let us pick out just some of these and pose a few questions re-
garding them, inviting new research into categories to fi nd more com-
plete answers. Without being able here to offer an in-depth study of 
these alternative lists of categories, various questions pose themselves: 
a. Is “state of affairs” (the being-[or not-being]-a-of-a-B”) not 
an ontic formation of the transcendental realm rather than a cat-
49. PLOTINO, Plotins Schriften (39-45). Band IVa. Text und Übersetzung. Übers. 
Richard Harder (Felix Meiner, Hamburg, 1967), 97-305.
50. Reinhardt Grossmann holds that a complete list of categories includes “substance, 
fact, property, process, whole, set” adding fi ve categories to Aristotle’s list. R. 
GROSSMANN, op. cit., xvi.
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egory, because it is found with respect to all beings, all categories, 
and all modes of being, and even regarding nothingness? Therefore 
it seems to be prior to the highest kinds of being and to belong —
like transcendental being, properties, and principles— to an onto-
logical realm prior to categories? I am strongly inclined to answer 
this question in the affi rmative.51
b. Is “fact” just a real state of affairs in the real world (Tatsache), 
or something different? If it is just a real state of affairs, one could 
indeed subsume it on the one hand under the more general datum 
of the odd transcendental: “states of affairs” (odd, because states of 
affairs are not properties of beings but an ontic formation sui generis 
related to all beings). On the other hand, since it is a well-defi ned 
and clear ontological structure, and differs as real “state of affairs” 
(fact) from ideal and other states of affairs, one may consider facts 
(real states of affairs) as one of the highest genera of real being, and 
as a kind of being that is irreducible to the other categories, and 
hence as a new category that ought to be added to Aristotle’s list. 
Also this question I recommend for future studies to the community 
of researchers into the topic of categories.
c. Is “process”, for example growth, or an event (for example 
the breaking out of World War I) a new highest kind of beings and 
hence a new category, or is it only a combination of the Aristotelian 
categories action and passion? If it is the latter, it would be an un-
necessary multiplication of categories to call process and event an 
eleventh or twelfth category; if the former, it might well qualify as 
a category of its own. “Process” is no doubt similar to Kant’ third 
category (allegedly based on the so-called relation of the —disjunc-
tive— judgment): “Of Community (reciprocity between the agent 
and patient)”. Kant interprets this category in a way that fi ts rather 
well processes as some relation between action and passion. Also this 
question cannot be answered easily.
Kant’s twelve categories cannot be discussed here in detail. Yet 
his list seems to merge categories with modes of being, as well as on-
51. For this and other reasons, such as that states of affairs cannot be “bearers of 
substances”, I fi nd the claim of J. CUMPA, Categoriality cit., 19 untenable, when 
he writes: “States of affairs are, then, the fl oor of the theory of categories, and 
being a constituent, the bearer of categories”.
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tological with logical categories. Moreover, they are quite artifi cially 
derived from the quantities, qualities, modalities and relations of the 
judgment. Such a derivation of ontological categories from the four 
divisions of judgments is artifi cial because, as Alexander Pfänder 
has shown in his Logic,52 the logical phenomena of quantity, quality, 
modality, and relation not only differ sharply from the ontological 
categories Kant seeks to derive from them, but make such a deriva-
tion wholly untenable. Besides, Kant reinterprets the ontological 
categories in a completely different subjective sense that deprives 
them from their authentic ontological sense and turns them into 
mere subjective forms of thought applicable to appearances only. 
Moreover, Kant’s list includes, besides highest kinds of being, other 
and more abstract properties and modalities of being such as real-
ity, possibility, and necessity, which can hardly be called “genera 
of being”. As previously noted, this and other lists of ontological 
categories are frequently assembled without a clear ontological and 
methodological foundation. Frequently, philosophers do not look 
for the same thing that Aristotle and we are looking for: namely for 
the highest genera of being, i.e., for what we understand ontological 
categories to be.
3. Refl ections on the Missing of Any Axiological Categories
 in Aristotle’s and Other Lists of Categories: 
On the Need to Include Value Categories among Ontological Categories
and on the Three Dimensions of Being
There is another very crucial lacuna in almost all lists of categories. 
Two ways in particular lead us to recognize this: a refl ection on the 
transcendentals and pure perfections and another one on the deep-
est dimension of being. In the list of transcendental properties of 
being which we have given above, at least two of seven, perhaps even 
three, are value properties characteristic in one way or another for 
all beings: the bonum (the good), the pulchrum (the beautiful), and 
the verum (the true or intelligible). Now not only do they in some 
52. A. PFÄNDER, Logik cit.
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way represent three different categories (highest genera) of values 
but they allow for many further subdivisions and categories. In most 
lists only the most basic genera of the transcendental ens (being, en-
tity) as well as of the transcendental res (essence) are the basis for the 
identifi cation of the highest genera of being. But why only them? 
Why not include also the highest genera of goodness (for example 
ontological values, intellectual values, vital values, aesthetic values, 
and moral values as well as the value of truth and intelligibility of 
being) among the categories?
Certainly, values and goodness are sui generis and somehow 
“consequential properties” that proceed from other characteristics 
of beings. This might have prevented philosophers from reckoning 
their supreme kinds among the categories of being. However, if the 
Good, as Plato maintained in the Politeia,53 holds the supreme place 
in being, should not the fundamental highest kinds of the good and of 
value also fi gure in the list of categories? If some value is found in all 
beings and is thus crucial to understand being itself properly, it seems 
logical to expect that the most basic kinds of goodness and of values 
likewise constitute highest genera of being, or at least are so essential 
for being that the different categories of value should be listed among 
the list of categories. The categories of importance, of motivation, of 
values, etc., as well as the highest value kinds that tradition has kept 
out of the realm of ontological categories, could be held to constitute 
a further sphere of purely ontological (value-)categories neglected in 
the Aristotelian and most other philosophies of categories.54
53. PLATO, Republic Books VI and VII. See J. SEIFERT, The Idea of the Good as the 
Sum-total of Pure Perfections. A New Personalistic Reading of Republic VI and VII, 
in G. REALE and S. SCOLNIKOV (eds.), New Images of Plato. Dialogues on the Idea 
of the Good (Academia Verlag, Sankt Augustin, 2002) 407-424.
54. On the most fundamental differentiation between different categories of 
importance as categories of human motivation and as objective ontological 
categories (Seinsproprietäten) cf. D. VON HILDEBRAND, Ethics. 2nd ed. (Franciscan 
Herald Press, Chicago, 1978), ch. 3-7. See also J. SEIFERT, Die verschiedenen 
Bedeutungen von ‘Sein’ - Dietrich von Hildebrand als Metaphysiker und Martin 
Heideggers Vorwurf der Seinsvergessenheit, in B. SCHWARZ (ed.) Wahrheit, Wert 
und Sein. Festgabe für Dietrich von Hildebrand zum 80. Geburtstag (Habbel, 
Regensburg, 1970) 301-332.
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Another way to arrive at the same result is the consideration 
that the gradation and hierarchy of being can be considered from 
the point of view of three dimensions or directions in which being 
is opposed to nothingness: through the degree of its 1. reality, 2. its 
intelligibility, and 3. its value. And of these three value and the good 
(that gives justifi cation of being and makes an entity something that 
not merely is but ought to be and is confi rmed in its being) is the 
deepest. Now we ask: Should the most fundamental and deepest 
dimension of being, its value, its being good that it is, be simply 
forgotten when one composes a list of ontological categories? It 
could thus be argued that different highest kinds of value consti-
tute ontological categories. Similarly, the fundamental genera of the 
verum, understood as intelligibility55, should also give rise to a basic 
categorization of degrees of intelligibility and lead to a list of onto-
logical categories of intelligibility. I cannot dwell on this within the 
limits of the present essay any longer.
4. Linguistic and Other Categories
From all of these categories we must distinguish the different cat-
egories of words and linguistic simple elements.56 Linguistic catego-
ries such as nouns, verbs, sentences, etc. do not regard and differen-
tiate different categories on the level of their meanings, which would 
constitute an extra-linguistic logical level, but as words, where of 
course, not merely the word-sounds but also the grammatical laws 
and indirectly the meanings of the concepts expressed in linguistic 
words and sentences determine the different linguistic categories, 
which we cannot investigate here at length. 
55. It can as well be understood as value of being. See J. SEIFERT, Wahrheit und 
Person cit., ch. 1, on the different senses of ontological truth, among which also 
value fi gures prominently.
56. Such simple uncomposed words that can be subjects or predicates of sentences 
are the starting point of Aristotle’s Categories. However, he goes immediately 
beyond the linguistic level to the meanings of these words, and, further, to 
the objects meant by such “uncomposed words” and analyzes not only their 
meanings and the logical categories but also the ontological categories meant 
by them. See ARISTOTLE, The Categories cit., 1b25-2a4.
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In all of these cases, however, when used rigorously, the term 
category refers to the highest (most basic) different genera within 
each of these phenomena. A further investigation into ontological 
categories we must leave to the future work of a large group of 
philosophical researchers and to future investigations of my own, 
having concentrated in the present essay chiefl y on ontological cat-
egories and having taken other categories into consideration only 
to the extent to which their inclusion in, or their delineation from, 
ontological categories helped us to understand ontological catego-
ries more deeply.
